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Summary
This paper will give a comprehensive framework of the current Sino-Croa-
tian economic relations. It will be primarily contextualised by Croatia’s sta-
tus as the newest EU member-state and by its membership in the China + 16 
framework for political, cultural and economic cooperation. Taking stock of 
this new institutional framework is essential in order to understand both the 
potential and the limitations to Sino-Croatian economic relations. Therefore, 
we will address this issue by nesting Croatian foreign economic policy within 
three hierarchical layers: the layer of Croatian membership in the EU, the 
layer of the China + 16 framework and, finally, the layer of the bilateral re-
lationship between the Republic of Croatia and the PRC. This reality is also 
confirmed by the recent statement by Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, the President 
of the Republic of Croatia. 
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Introduction
Ever since the establishment of diplomatic relations and the official recognition of 
Croatia’s statehood, the Republic of Croatia and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) have had a rather significant economic and political exchange.1 This has 
been predominantly represented in political contacts and closely followed by trade. 
On the other hand, investments and tourism have only started to gain traction re-
cently. This paper will give a comprehensive framework of the current Sino-Croa-
tian economic relations. It will be primarily contextualised by Croatia’s status as the 
newest EU member-state and by its membership in the China + 16 framework for 
1 This paper was written within the 16+1 High-Level Academic Platform, established by Central 
Compilation & Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
and Poznan University of Economics and Business, and presented at the conference held in War-
saw on 20 and 21 October 2016.
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political, cultural and economic cooperation. Taking stock of this new institutional 
framework is essential in order to understand both the potential and the limitations 
to Sino-Croatian economic relations. Therefore, we will address this issue by nest-
ing Croatian foreign economic policy within three hierarchical layers: the layer of 
Croatian membership in the EU, the layer of the China + 16 framework and, finally, 
the layer of the bilateral relationship between the Republic of Croatia and the PRC. 
This is also confirmed by the recent statement by Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, the 
President of the Republic of Croatia (Grabar-Kitarović, 2015). She claims that Si-
no-Croatian bilateral relations have been upgraded by cooperation under the banner 
of the EU-China dialogue and the recently launched China + 16 framework.
Given the prevailing structure of international relations and challenges ema-
nating from the international arena, Christopher Hill (2003) identifies several po-
tential avenues for envisaging a foreign policy that is appropriate for the context 
of small states such as Croatia. These are: multilateralism, specialisation in arenas 
deemed as a priority and the politics of quietism. The first two avenues can be easi-
ly paired with the first and the second layers of Sino-Croatian economic relations. 
Croatia’s EU membership represents a multilateral context and the ‘China + 16’ or 
‘16+1’ framework covers the potential for specialisation in arenas deemed as a pri-
ority. This paper starts with the EU-China dialogue in order to determine the art of 
the possible in fostering closer economic cooperation between Zagreb and Beijing. 
The second part covers China + 16 and its impact on strengthening Sino-Croatian 
economic relations. Finally, the paper concludes by giving an overview of the Sino-
Croatian bilateral economic relations since Croatia’s independence.
The EU-China Dialogue and Its Impact on Sino-Croatian Economic Relations
The EU represents a historical landmark in the attempt to establish a model of deep 
regional economic integration. Despite the progress in integrating many policy are-
as such as agriculture and trade policy, the EU does not share a common foreign 
economic policy.2 The EU foreign economic policy can be modelled as a principal-
agent (PA) approach. There is a long chain of delegation that incorporates several 
hierarchically organized PA relationships such as: interest groups and voters to na-
tional legislators, national legislators to executives, member-states to the Commis-
sion, voters and EU federations of interest groups to the European Parliament, the 
European Parliament to the Commission and, finally, the EU to international orga-
nizations (Dür and Elsig, 2011). 
2 Foreign economic policy covers multiple issues such as: international trade, international 
monetary relations, international financial policy, competition policy, development aid and the 
regulation of FDI. 
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This means the EU is still divided across geographical and sectoral lines, which 
is additionally exacerbated by the lingering impact of the eurozone’s economic im-
broglio. All of which, therefore, has to be taken into account when analysing both 
the EU’s stance towards China and Croatia’s role in the EU’s foreign economic 
policy-making. The EU member-states’ stance towards China can be grouped into 
four distinct clusters based on two criteria: economic attitude and political attitude. 
There are two diametrically opposed outcomes on the scale which measures the 
economic attitude: protectionist and liberal. On the scale which portrays the politi-
cal attitude we can distinguish another two outcomes: supportive and critical (Fox 
and Godement, 2009). When combining the two criteria and their subcategories we 
can indicate four clusters:
1. Assertive Industrialists. This group encompasses countries with a more 
critical stance towards the PRC along both dimensions, the economic and the po-
litical. In this group we can enlist Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic.3 This 
group is more open to criticizing human rights issues and is also more vocal in 
stressing the need to be tough on China’s infringement of intellectual property 
rights (IPR), as well as on the lack of China’s emphasis on more liberal trade and 
investment in the international order. The common denominator for those countries 
is the critical view of the EU’s rather unconditional engagement with the PRC.
2. Ideological Free-traders. This group subsumes the likes of Sweden, Den-
mark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.4 They are ready to pressure China 
on political issues, but are reluctant to endorse the imposition of restrictions on 
trade. Those countries are specialised in exporting services and perceive their op-
portunity in that particular sector. Therefore, they are not so keen on criticising Chi-
na’s trade-distorting practices in the manufacturing sector.
3. Accommodating Mercantilists. These countries steadily point out the 
growing EU-China trade deficit. After EU consumption picked up in 2014, the 
EU’s trade deficit with China increased by an additional 5.9 billion EUR from 2013 
to 2014 (Bendini and Barone, 2015). The EU’s overall trade deficit with China 
amounted to 137.8 billion EUR in 2014 (ibid.). In light of these facts, countries such 
as Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal are advocating for a tougher stance towards the 
3 The attachment to a particular cluster is not cast in stone and it is a rather fluid process, de-
pendent on the internal political context of each given EU member-state. The case of the Czech 
Republic illustrates this point. Ever since Miloš Zeman took over the Czech Presidency, he has 
been keen on fostering closer ties with China and Russia as opposed to the EU and the US. Chi-
nese intelligence has been building influence in Czech political circles and this could be linked 
with a change in Czech foreign policy trajectory (Muller and Lopatka, 2016).
4 It is to be seen how the Brexit will play out in the heated debate between protectionist and 
liberal blocs of countries within the EU.
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issue of granting China ‘market economy status’. At the same time, these countries 
are more willing to refrain from criticising China on political issues, in order to se-
cure China’s benevolence in improving their market access.
4. European Followers. In the last group we can lump together the countries 
that do not consider their relationship with China as a very important pillar of their 
foreign economic policy. These are: Austria, the Baltic countries and Ireland. They 
are rather followers than agenda-setters when it comes to the EU-China dialogue.
When analysing Croatia’s position within these four different clusters, we can 
undoubtedly conclude that Croatia represents a European Follower. This conclusion 
could be partly inferred from the data on bilateral trade measures against China’s 
exports, as evidenced by the WTO’s Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal, and by 
relying on the voting record of the European Parliament and the Council of Minis-
ters. At the moment, there are no bilateral trade measures against China, while some 
Central and Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
have at least one measure directed at China’s exports (World Trade Organization, 
2016). In its trade relations with China, Croatia applies only common EU protec-
tionist measures. When it comes to the political attitude on granting China ‘market 
economy status’ (read: stripping off import duties), all Croatian members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament recently voted in line with their party groups’ dominant position, 
which puts them in the category of European Followers.5 
Before advancing to Croatia’s impact on the EU’s external position vis-à-vis 
China, it is essential to briefly outline the basic tenets and frictions in current EU-
China bilateral relations. We will start with investments and public procurement. 
Despite the recent launch of bilateral negotiations on a common investment regime, 
the talks between the EU and the PRC have not produced considerable progress 
5 The issue at stake was labelling China as a ‘market economy’ which eliminates the authority 
to use certain trade protection measures on the part of EU member-states. The amendment to the 
joint motion of the European Parliament which explicitly requires that the EU should withhold 
from granting China the aforementioned status, even if China does not satisfy the EU criteria 
for defining the market economy, was voted down by the majority of MEPs (VoteWatch, 2016). 
The EPP and ALDE groupations were against the motion, while Socialists abstained from taking 
a firm position. Despite the fact that not all centre-right Croatian MEPs are staunch advocates 
of freer trade with China, they decided to follow the main chorus line of their respective party 
families. Croatian Social Democrats abstained and HDZ/EPP members sided with the majority 
of CDU/CSU and ÖVP members, despite cleavages present within the German and Austrian par-
ties. Those cleavages can be explained by different cross-sectoral impacts of trade liberalising 
measures and the political mobilisation to oppose them. Given the absence of this kind of bot-
tom-up mobilisation and cleavages in the case of Croatia, one can certainly conclude that China-
pertaining issues do not achieve high political salience in Croatia as compared to the majority of 
EU member-states. This absence of internal divisions provides an explanation for why we put 
Croatia in the category of European Followers. 
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since 2014.6 This comes in spite of an upward trend in China’s investments into 
EU economies, which have averaged more than 10 billion EUR in the period since 
2010. Those investments are a growing testimony to the new long-term structural 
trend in EU-China relations (Baker&McKenzie, 2015). Lacking any major break-
through with regard to the investment regime, the Chinese side tried to step up its 
negotiating position by proposing a completely new dimension of economic coope-
ration. This was epitomised by the initiation of a comprehensive EU-China Free 
Trade Agreement during President Xi Jinping’s historic visit to Brussels in 2014. 
However praiseworthy, the proclaimed interest in boosting trade is not paired 
with the bidirectionally of investment flows, whereby both sides put an equal em-
phasis on the principle of reciprocity. Regrettably, there is an obvious asymmetry in 
the current openness to clearing investment hurdles. Supported by the vast sums of 
state capital, Chinese companies can buy the likes of Volvo, Syngenta and Pirelli, 
but the takeover of China’s large companies still remains elusive to European inves-
tors. On the other hand, 80% of the EU’s public procurement is open to international 
competition while the figure for China is estimated at only 14% (Godement, 2016). 
Unfortunately, the EU currently has only a limited amount of negotiating capital 
and resources for the prospective EU-China agreement, since it is highly committed 
to the ongoing TTIP negotiations.7 
Besides bilateral investment flows and public procurement, the EU is also con-
fronted with the contentious issue of granting China the highly prized ‘market econo-
my status’. Under the existing framework of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 
(Protocol 15), there is a 15 years transition period within which WTO members are 
allowed to effectively deny the ‘market economy’ treatment. One of the main rea-
sons for the reluctance on the part of EU policy-makers to unleash free trade flows 
is their experience with China’s slow transition to market-based mechanisms in 
conducting economic policy, ever since its WTO accession in 2001. Furthermore, 
many NGOs, trade unions and sectoral producers such as Eurofer complain that the 
change of policy stance would inadvertently backfire on EU’s economy and con-
sumers. Giving up some steep tariffs in sectors such as ceramics, steel and textile 
would additionally aggravate the current economic malaise of countries where most 
of those industries are located: Spain, Italy and France (Steinbock, 2016).8
6 China’s approach to regulating investments is still primarily bilateral.
7 The EU’s negotiating focus will be even narrower in the coming years given the recent deci-
sion of the majority of Britons to vote for Brexit. This does not augur well for achieving progress 
on the aforementioned issues.
8 Croatia has a similar economic structure to other Mediterranean economies. Therefore, the 
garment, furniture and footwear industries are protected by the common EU tariffs and anti-
dumping measures. 
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At the moment, anti-dumping measures are applied to Chinese exports in sec-
tors well-known for their overcapacity, such as ceramics, solar panels, steel, textiles 
and apparel. The WTO’s Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal shows that the EU has 
imposed a total of 67 anti-dumping and 5 countervailing measures related to Chi-
na’s export to the EU. The EU also identified 14 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
and 24 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) issues as Specific Trade Concerns with 
China. On the other hand, China put in force 20 anti-dumping and 2 countervailing 
measures to EU imports. One must also add 51 Specific Trade Concerns on behalf 
of China’s industries to the list (World Trade Organisation, 2016). 
According to the Economic Policy Institute report, there are 1.7 to 3.5 million 
EU jobs at risk from unilaterally relinquishing the authority to use anti-dumping 
and anti-subsidy measures under the banner of targeting non-market economy prac-
tices (Scott and Jiang, 2015). The study also envisions the flood of Chinese imports 
into the EU to the tune of 142.5 billion EUR by 2020 (AEGIS Europe, 2016). In this 
paper, it is especially important to note that the EPI report states that the six worst 
affected countries in terms of job loss relative to the size of their economy are the 
main Eastern European member-states (Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Hungary and Slovakia).9 
In spite of being designated as a market economy by developed countries, 
such as Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, the EU holds a common line with 
the US and Canada. To be considered a ‘market economy’, the EU requests that 
the following set of criteria be fulfilled: a country must have a floating exchange 
rate, a free market, a non-intrusive government, effective business accounting stan-
dards and, lastly, a clear definition of property rights and bankruptcy laws (Bendini, 
2014). In spite of the Chinese leadership’s incantations of major structural reforms 
at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2013, China has not delivered 
on the reforms pertaining to the criteria deemed essential for granting the country 
‘market economy status’. Therefore, the EU is currently straddling a very chal-
lenging political terrain since it is confronted with the issue of protecting domestic 
industries and upholding international treaties, regardless of their ambiguous for-
mulation.10
9 Unfortunately, Croatia is not included in the EPI report, so there are only wide guesses of the 
full impact of China’s increased exports if its non-market economy status were to be revoked. 
Nevertheless, this does not bode well for Croatia’s import-competing and export-oriented pro-
ducers in sectors that are in competition with China.
10 Chinese authorities primarily put the emphasis on lobbying activities instead of on making 
some significant liberalising economic reforms at home. Their goal is targeting the EU’s specific 
multilevel governance form, using member-states as a key access point. This strategy should re-
sult in mollifying the EU’s common position (Kratz, 2016).
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There are several scenarios of how this EU-China quandary could play out. 
The first scenario could be described as doing nothing. If the EU abstained from 
granting China ‘market economy status’, China would challenge this decision in a 
legal dispute before the WTO, a scenario that would almost certainly result in a de-
terioration in bilateral relations (Kratz, 2016). This may even lead to the escalation 
of tariffs, stoking a trade war. The second scenario implies the decision that China 
be qualified in the league of market economies, but without mitigating measures to 
stem the flow of heavily subsidised Chinese goods. The third scenario of how to 
overcome this impasse is for the EU to grant China ‘market economy status’ while 
at the same time implementing a major reform of its trade defence instruments. This 
scenario would establish a firm WTO-proof trade regime affecting all countries, in-
cluding China. Literally, this means identifying a list of justified reasons to label 
some countries’ exports as those produced in the absence of a level-playing field. 
The aforementioned framework would be able to deflect China’s complaint of being 
treated in a discriminatory fashion.
Therefore, it seems plausible that the EU will persist with its anti-dumping 
policy even beyond 2016, but in a legally sounder form. However, the revision of 
its trade policy framework is inevitable. As already stated above, the EU is caught 
between the task of protecting its economies and the need to attract Chinese invest-
ments. The potential for further progress in trade issues definitely exists. However, 
apart from the revamped trade defence regime, the EU could insist on long-term fi-
nancial flows from China to compensate the losers of a more open trade, as well as 
on a major overhaul of China’s economic policy. Only after observing this kind of 
improvement could it be sensibly expected that both the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers would eliminate the remaining trade disputes. 
Despite of all the aforementioned obstacles, the bilateral trade relations be-
tween China and the EU have been generally good. The EU has become the biggest 
importer of China’s goods to the tune of 1 billion EUR per day (European Com-
mission, 2016). Meanwhile, the trade in services lags behind with a significantly 
lower volume, but with an upward trend. In terms of investments, the EU invests 
only 2-3% of its yearly outward flow to China, while China has been stepping up 
its EU investment efforts in the last 4 years (Bendini and Barone, 2015). The over-
all quality of EU-China bilateral economic relations can be inferred from the Euro-
pean Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015 (ECFR, 2015). It provides a glimpse into the 
EU-China dynamics during the 2010-2014 period. While some areas mark a slight 
progress such as the formats of Europe-China dialogue and investments & market 
access in China, the overall picture looks more or less the same during the whole 
period under comparison.
After this extensive elaboration of the wider EU-China framework, we have to 
position Croatia within these confines. As already discussed above, the Republic of 
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Croatia can be categorised as a European Follower in terms of its foreign economic 
policy towards the PRC. Its agenda-setting power is seriously curtailed and we pro-
vide a twofold explanation. There are two important factors for effectively bringing 
China-related issues to the joint table in Brussels. Firstly, the degree of power and 
influence at the level of the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Se-
condly, the degree of identification of China-related issues as important at the level 
of national polity. 
In order to elucidate the first factor we start with the recent empirical study on 
the power matrix in the EU. The central question of this study points to the degree 
in which national political leaders are effective at combining forces with their am-
bassadors to the EU, to ensure power and influence (Heath, 2016). The matrix dis-
plays that Croatia is the least politically influential EU member-state. Effectively, 
this translates into Croatia’s lack of a meaningful voice on important internal EU 
issues, as well as on issues which encompass EU relations with third countries. 
For the sake of identifying the second factor we stress the level of identification of 
China-related issues as important in the domestic political arena. When analysing 
political manifestos of all Croatian parliamentary parties, none of them, apart from 
the party Živi zid, mentions any issue pertained to Sino-Croatian relations. Unfor-
tunately, Živi zid, a populist party with only one representative in the Croatian Par-
liament, has been very far from taking any kind of systematic approach to China. It 
only claims that Croatia should mirror China’s policy of RMB devaluation in order 
to boost its competitiveness.
Even in the ideal case of having more foreign policy leverage in Brussels and 
raising the level of awareness about China-related issues in the Croatian political 
arena, Croatia would face the same dilemma as all other EU members. On the one 
hand, by forging very intensive and warm bilateral ties with China, each member-
state may acquire gains with regard to China’s investments or increased export pos-
sibilities (Fox and Godement, 2009). However, the lack of a coherent EU-wide 
strategy towards China undermines the EU’s common position on many issues such 
as trade disputes, an investment regime, global governance, climate change and hu-
man rights. 
Table 1.
CATEGORY 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
1. Formats of Europe-China dialogue B- B B- C+ C+
2. Investments & market access in China B B+ B- B- B-
3. Overall partnership B- B C+ C+ B-
Source: European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015
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It also has the potential to engulf EU member-states in a fierce competition to 
bid for China’s resources, while limiting their collective bargaining power (ibid.). 
Therefore, the EU membership as a framework for Croatia’s foreign economic po-
licy sets the tone and limits what is politically feasible on many important issues. 
Hill’s (2003) emphasis on multilateralism in case of small states gives a good fo-
reign economic policy guidance. The Republic of Croatia cannot single-handedly 
grant ‘market economy status’ to China or sign a special bilateral investment treaty 
without having in mind the need for a common EU approach to bargaining with the 
PRC.11 Nevertheless, there are many areas where Croatia could profit from a more 
frictionless cooperation with China. The following sections provide a glimpse into 
the arenas and issues where Croatia’s foreign economic policy can leverage its po-
sition.
The China + 16 Framework and Its Impact 
on Sino-Croatian Economic Relations
The China + 16 framework refers to various mechanisms and arrangements be-
tween China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries (CEE countries) that 
was established after Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Poland in 2012. Subsequently, 
the China + 16 cooperation framework has helped to deepen mutual political trust, 
build cooperation mechanisms and frameworks, and develop practical collaboration 
among all parties (Minru, 2015). The main advantage of this cooperation framework 
is its loose form (Tianping, 2015). Nevertheless, some critics argue that the current 
framework is similar to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), “a front 
of nice speeches, and deals that are purely bilateral as opposed to regional” (Gode-
ment, 2016: 9). Regardless of its current format and future trajectory, China + 16 
builds on the already existing intensification of trade and investment ties between 
CEE countries and China. We illustrate this in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4.
It is clearly observable that China has trade surpluses with all of the above-
mentioned countries. Only Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Bulgaria have had some 
success in recently curbing trade deficits with China. All countries except Croatia 
imported more goods from China in 2014 than in 2004. Croatia more than halved 
its imports at the time when it was on its way to becoming an EU member (Garlick, 
2015). Nevertheless, Croatia’s reduced imports from China could be overestimated 
due to the substitution of direct imports from China with imports of Chinese goods 
from other EU countries. On the other hand, Slovakia’s stark increase in exports to 
China overestimates the share of Slovakian merchandise due to German carmakers’ 
11 As already noted at the outset, small states can reap significant benefits from relying on a 
multilateral approach.
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Figure 1. China’s Trade with Višegrad Group Countries (in millions of euros)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 2. China’s Trade with Other EU Countries which Fall into the CEE Group
(in millions of euros)
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 3. China’s FDI Stock in 6 Countries with the Biggest Investment Inflow
(1 unit = 10000 USD)
Source: Tianping, 2015
Figure 4. China’s FDI Stock in the Remaining 10 CEE Countries
(1 unit = 10000 USD)
Source: Tianping, 2015
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presence in that country. Therefore, trade balance figures should take into account 
the peculiarities of modern trade statistics.
China’s implementation of the China + 16 formula for meetings includes the 
CEE11 plus Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Alba-
nia. Some analysts point out that this strategy has de facto created a new grouping 
that straddles EU and non-EU states in a way that tends to negate the EU’s leverage 
on China’s negotiations with those states. Nevertheless, some authors suggest that 
China is not that much interested in weakening the EU as a pillar of the multipo-
lar world order. On the contrary, China is keener on strengthening the China + 16 
framework or on picking partners with a more pro-EU stance, than on choosing EU 
rebels as allies in the quest of dividing the EU (Turcsanyi, 2014).12 As a part of its 
‘going out strategy’ Chinese foreign policy obviously prefers countries with solid 
economies, an excellent ratio between quality and the cost of production, stable 
governments and a good stance in the EU (Garlick, 2015). Ideological and political 
underpinnings of cooperation play a less prominent role.13 
The analysis of potential synergies between China and CEE countries offers 
some tentative conclusions. Firstly, China is trying to align the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative with CEE countries development priorities. Chinese infrastructure invest-
ments and the Juncker plan offer considerable synergies for booming commerce, 
tourism and investment flows. This is also compatible with the Baltics-Adria initia-
tive (Grabar-Kitarović, 2015).14 The construction of major transportation corridors 
would further integrate the Euroasian landmass and markets. The most recent ex-
ample refers to the DHL Global Forwarding, which launched a weekly intermodal 
service from Suzhou to Warsaw.15 Secondly, both sides lack the knowledge of vital 
12 Hungary’s attempt at leveraging fast rapprochement with China in 2012 against the EU’s 
pressure on Prime Minister Orban’s practices was not greeted enthusiastically by China.
13 According to Li Zuokui, the Head of Research at the CEEC Research Institute Europe, and 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, there are several important obstacles to cooperation 
between China and CEE countries. These are: the difference in ideology; differences in the level 
of development; debt and refugee crisis hitting the EU; the heavy reliance of CEEC on the US 
and the EU, which implies the need for China to pay attention to these strategic realities and, fi-
nally, risks such as the spectre of terrorism threat in Europe (China Radio International, 2015).
14 The Adriatic – Baltic – Black Sea Initiative was first put forward by the Croatian President 
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović in September 2015. It should be viewed as a framework for enhanced 
cooperation in political, economic and security areas among 12 EU member-states in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Chinese president Xi met with President Grabar-Kitarović in Beijing and wel-
comed the Adriatic – Baltic – Black Sea Initiative. He also stressed that the development of the 
North – South corridor within the EU is complementary to China’s One Belt, One Road strategy.
15 The journey lasts 14 days, it takes half the time of ocean freight and is one sixth of the cost of 
air freight (Railway Gazette, 2014).
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business culture and practices. In this sense, the plethora of different cooperation 
platforms raises the prospect of enhancing social capital and expanding social net-
work.
The China + 16 framework relies on annual summits of prime ministers. This 
year will mark the sixth summit which underlines the continuity of mutual ex-
change. National coordinators are crucial in the summit preparation and they play 
the role of so-called sherpas. It is also worth mentioning the China + 16 Economic 
Trade Forum which is held annually. As noted before, China + 16 offers the advan-
tage of ad hoc cooperation on a voluntary basis. The possibility of specialisation in 
arenas deemed as priorities is one of the key leverages in small states’ foreign policy 
(Hill, 2003). Bearing that in mind, it is crucial to point to the role and diplomatic 
activity of the Republic of Croatia in the China + 16 framework up to the present. 
The former Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović attended the Warsaw 
Summit in 2012, as well as the Bucharest Summit in 2013. In Bucharest he met 
with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang who congratulated Croatia on becoming 
the 28th EU member-state and expressed his expectation that Croatia would play a 
positive role in promoting China-EU relations, as well as cooperation between Chi-
na and the CEEC. Milanović remarked that Croatia and China had enjoyed a close 
cooperation and that Croatia was willing to take the advantage of its geographi-
cal position to enhance cooperation with China. This refers primarily to the area 
of transportation infrastructure so as to promote regional economic development 
(Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 2016). 
However, the Croatian Prime Minister was not present at the Belgrade Summit in 
2014. The main reason for this absence was the Prime Minister’s dissatisfaction 
with the stance of Serbian authorities toward provocations uttered by the leader of 
ultra-nationalist Serb radical party, Vojislav Šešelj. Instead, Croatia’s First Deputy 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Vesna Pusić at-
tended the Belgrade Summit. In November 2015 the 5th 16+1 summit ensued in 
Suzhou, China. Again, ex-Prime Minister Milanović was absent and had sent Josip 
Leko, the then Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, as an envoy.16
16 After failing to attend the Belgrade summit, the Prime Minister Milanović declared that he 
had attended the first two summits out of politeness and that he would have had attended the 
third one, only if “it were not for these matters that took place during the last few days”. There 
was also an interesting remark that during 16+1 meetings the political dialogue takes prece-
dence over detailed negotiations on substantive issues, as well as that no major Chinese invest-
ments had made inroads into Croatia. He stated that the main problem identified by the Croatian 
side is that contracts are gained by public tenders according to the EU rules, and that Chinese 
investors had not applied for them since they expected to obtain projects in the course of politi-
cal negotiations.
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Unfortunately, when it comes to the potential of carving up a niche or speciali-
sation within the 16+1 framework, Croatia’s diplomatic activity seems pretty lame 
and reactive. None of the initiatives based on the functional division of cooperation 
tasks has been launched by Croatia. For instance, Serbia will set up a China-CEEC 
Federation of Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation. The executive office of the 
China-CEEC Joint Chamber of Commerce will be stationed in Warsaw, and the se-
cretariat of the China-CEEC Contact Mechanism for Investment Promotion Agen-
cies will be established in Beijing and Warsaw. Bulgaria will host the China-CEEC 
Federation of Agricultural Cooperation; The Czech Republic will host the China-
CEEC Federation of Heads of Local Governments; and Romania took the initiative 
to set up a China-CEEC Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects 
(Tianping, 2015). The only improvement in the level of Croatian engagement with 
the China + 16 framework, as compared to the period from 2012 to 2015, points to 
the hosting of the 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation 
in 2016. The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and 
Eastern European Countries provide evidence for this particular conclusion (Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016). 
This year’s summit in Latvia will show whether the Croatian side is ready to 
pay more attention to the China + 16 framework, either with the participation of the 
Croatian Prime Minister or the President of the Republic. The appointment of a new 
Croatian national coordinator for the framework is also of vital importance.17 The 
former government spent more than 100 days in office without solving this press-
ing issue. It is to be seen whether new elections in September will quickly lead to 
the formation of a stable government dedicated to the China + 16 framework. The 
government’s instability clearly hampers active engagement on the part of Croatian 
policy-makers with the China + 16 framework and shows that Croatia’s foreign eco-
nomic policy towards China is lagging.
As a conclusion to this section we claim that there are many opportunities for 
Croatia to tap into the China + 16 cooperation framework, especially in the domain 
of investments and trade. Only the reliance on a closer coordination with neigh-
bouring countries carries the potential for attracting more Chinese FDI to Croatia. 
This is feasible both for infrastructure and greenfield/brownfield investments due to 
their proximity to the Western European market. The analysis of benefits of a closer 
cooperation between Central and Eastern European countries on China-related is-
sues points to the advantage of reduced transaction costs and lower entry barriers 
if these costs are to be split among various partners. If faced with obstacles of low 
quantities or high entry barriers when entering China’s market, it makes sense to 
17 The new national coordinator is Leo Prelec, the Deputy Minister of Economy in Orešković’s 
technical government.
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pool resources at multiple levels. Thus far, Croatia has shown noticeable reluctance 
to commit more to the active engagement with and within the framework. This can 
be inferred both from the rank of officials sent to the annual China + 16 summits 
and the number of initiatives undertaken by Croatian diplomacy. Consequently, the 
China + 16 framework represents an under-utilised avenue for improving Sino-Cro-
atian economic relations.
Sino-Croatian Economic Relations Since Croatia’s Independence
Ever since the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the Republic of Croatia and the People’s Republic of China, Croatia and 
China have cultivated their bilateral economic cooperation. One of the forerunners 
of this cooperation is represented by the partnership of INA and Sinochem in sup-
plying Croatia with petrol during the Homeland War (Baković, 2006). Many bila-
teral business contacts proliferated afterwards, were followed up by the formal in-
stitutionalisation of bilateral economic relations. There exists a mechanism of the 
Sino-Croatian Joint Committee for Economy and Trade between the governments 
of China and Croatia. China and Croatia have signed the following agreements: 
Agreement on Economy and Trade, Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and the 
Protection of Investments, Agreement on Avoiding Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Tax Evasion, Memorandum of Understanding between Croatia and China 
on the Establishment of a Croatian – Chinese Economic and Technological Zone, 
and many others (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of 
Croatia, 2014). 
According to the index of political-diplomatic importance, China nominally 
plays a very important role in Croatian foreign policy. The index consists of five 
indicators: 1. the existence of a Croatian diplomatic mission; 2. the existence of a 
Croatian consulate; 3. the existence of signed bilateral agreements and acts; 4. the 
existence of inter-parliamentary friendship groups between Croatia and a particular 
country; 5. state visits, the highest expression of friendly relations between two sove-
reign states, in this case visits of the Croatian presidents, prime ministers or mini-
sters of foreign affairs (Kos-Stanišić, 2010). An overview of Sino-Croatian diplo-
matic relations is given in Table 2.













China Yes (Beijing) Yes (Hong Kong) Yes (44) Yes (2001) Yes (9)
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Regardless of the presence of all five indicators in Sino-Croatian bilateral re-
lations, China is not significantly anchored as a reference point for Croatian poli-
cy-makers. The lack of focus towards China is evident when analysing the sample 
of 23 Croatian strategic documents for the keyword ‘China’. The sample closely 
tracks key areas under purview of key Croatian ministries. We only found ‘China’ 
in two strategic documents: the Tourism Development Strategy and the Transport 
Development Strategy. On the other hand, strategic plans of the Ministry of Fo-
reign and European affairs for the following periods: 2013-2015, 2014-2016, 2015-
2017 and 2016-2018 show that China is only mentioned in the plan for the period 
between 2013-2015. However, this occurred solely in the context of referring to the 
BRICS formation. Notwithstanding the fact that China enjoys a very significant 
place in Croatian foreign policy, if assessed by the high score on the index of poli-
tical-diplomatic importance, this advantage is not translated into intensive coopera-
tion in bilateral economic relations.
In the domain of trade, China is still not among the top 20 Croatian export mar-
kets. In terms of imports, China was Croatia’s 8th import partner in 2014 (The Ob-
servatory of Economic Complexity, 2016). This should be contrasted with the fact 
that China has been the top export market for 43 countries in the world (Holodny, 
2015). The trading potential between China and Croatia is heavily under-utilised on 
the part of Croatian exporters. This is reflected in the constant trade deficit in goods 
from 2005-2015. On the other hand, Croatia incurs a healthy surplus in selling ser-
vices, especially due to the influx of Chinese tourists to Croatia. There is a great 
potential for growth in tourism, especially when the number of Chinese guests and 
nights spent is compared to incoming tourists from Japan and South Korea (Table 3). 
Thus far, the trade deficit has not been narrowed by revenue from trade in services, 
which points to a steady current account deficit. We illustrate this in Figures 5 and 
6, as well as Table 3. Croatia’s biggest export items regularly include machines for 
processing leather and rubber, as well as timber (Croatian Chamber of Economy). It 
is important to maintain the country’s presence in these market niches. The biggest 
potential for Croatian exports lies in tourism, and the food and beverage process-
ing industry, IT and furniture. Apart from boosting the trade volume, there is also 
a potential to improve the structure of trade. Further diversification and a move to-
wards more value-added items is particularly desirable. The Croatian Chamber of 
Economy plans to open up its representative office in Shanghai by the end of 2016. 
This constitutes a move in the right direction. The planned Sino-Croatian coordina-
tion could span joint public and private initiatives in various sectors. 
Speaking of investments, Croatia is in the group with Slovakia, Slovenia, Cy-
prus, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, with less than 100 million USD of Chi-
nese FDI in 2014. In 2014, less than 5% of China’s investments into the EU were 
concentrated in the CEE 11 countries. Several Chinese investors have announced 
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Figure 5. 
Source: Croatian Chamber of Economy
Figure 6.
Source: Croatian National Bank
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large scale greenfield projects in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years, but the 
progress has been slow to date. A case in point is the China International Invest-
ment Stock’s joint venture for building a paper mill in Croatia (Baker&McKenzie, 
2015). Obviously, on the one hand, there is much talking and wishful thinking on 
the part of Croatian media and politicians about Chinese investments in Croatia. On 
the other hand, the investment terms required by China are often structured in such 
a way that only the non-EU members, free of EU rules, could avail themselves of 
the offers (Godement, 2016). The EU’s competition policy dissuades any attempt 
of skewing the level-playing field by attracting investments with the carrot of sub-
sidies, state guarantees and the lack of transparency. The project for the Port of 
Rijeka is the best example that words are not followed by deeds, despite declared 
interest on both sides of the deal. The overall picture is illustrated by Figures 7 and 
8. Despite the recent jump in Chinese investments to Croatia, they started from a 
very low base and offer plenty of room for further improvement. There were only a 
handful of Croatian companies present in the Chinese market in 2016 (Table 4). As 
already stated above, the biggest potential lies in tourism, the food and beverages 
processing industry, IT and infrastructure. 
Table 3.
Foreign tourists in 1000 Nights in 1000






43 42 61 145,2 64 63 89 141,3
Japan 155 159 177 111,3 220 221 247 111,8
Republic 
of Korea 47 74 264 356,8 62 98 328 334,7
Domestic tourists in 1000 Nights in 1000






1371 1368 1350 98,7 11177 11136 10796 96,9
Japan 85 95 110 115,8 549 539 1344 249,4
Republic 
of Korea No data No data No data No data No data No data No data No data
Source: Croatian Tourist National Board
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Finally, when considering financial flows other than FDI, there is also plenty 
of scope for capitalising on the potential for collaboration. China’s credit mecha-
nism of 10 billion USD earmarked for 16 CEE countries represents a good source 
of long-term finance. Nevertheless, the EU members of the China + 16 framework 
should push for a joint revision of the lending criteria, which continues to depend 
heavily on state guarantees. Apparently, there is an issue of incompatibility with the 
EU’s competition policy framework. Last, but not the least important opportunity 
represents the potential of signing the bilateral currency swap agreement between 
the Croatian National Bank and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Five members 
of the China + 16 framework can already tap into liquidity provided by the PBOC 
when necessary. Apart from Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as eurozone 
members, Albania can also call upon the credit line in RMB when trade finance is 
scarce (Li, 2015). In order to diversify its foreign exchange reserves, a slight move 
towards holding 3-5% reserves denominated in RMB would be a welcome step for 
the Croatian National Bank, especially in the context of rising RMB internalisation.
Conclusion
Sino-Croatian economic relations are nested into three hierarchical layers. Within 
the EU, Croatia’s foreign economic policy vis-à-vis China can be categorised as 
that of a European Follower. There has been a very limited scope for diplomatic ac-
tion and improvement of Sino-Croatian economic relations within the first layer of 
China-EU bilateral dialogue. The major obstacle is found in the lack of Croatia’s 
foreign policy leverage in Brussels and the lack of political salience for EU-China 
issues among Croatian policy-makers. Croatian foreign economic policy-makers 
are best advised to stick with the principle of multilateralism in order to reap bene-
fits emanating from the economy of scale. However, they should be aware that the 
EU’s position on matters such as anti-dumping measures or investment disputes is 
the result of diverse cross-country and cross-sectoral interests. This requires special 
attention to the structure of the Croatian economy and the need for modelling sce-
narios of how China’s ‘market economy status’ would impact key Croatian macro-
economic variables. 
As opposed to the first layer, the China + 16 framework and bilateral relations 
between the PRC and the Republic of Croatia offer the opportunity for more agency 
on the part of Croatian policy-makers. The strategy of specialisation in the arena 
deemed as a priority provides every small state, keen on exploiting its comparative 
advantage, with a useful strategic tool. The functional distribution of tasks within 
the China + 16 where Croatia’s neighbours and partners have decided to host various 
institutional offshoots and coordinative bodies serves as a stark contrast to Croatia’s 
aloofness and passivity. Coordination and specialisation in the domain of tourism 
would be a welcome step forward. Other important steps would include an im-
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Figure 7. 
Source: Croatian National Bank
Figure 8.
Source: Croatian National Bank
proved coordination and exchange of information with CEE partners with the goal 
of lowering transaction costs and entry barriers for exporters to China. The coordi-
nation could span joint public and private initiatives in various sectors. Therefore, 
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Croatian economic diplomacy should leverage renewed Chinese interest in CEE 
countries to the benefit of Croatia’s economy and the economies of its neighbours. 
Finally, bilateral economic relations between Zagreb and Beijing could be put on an 
even better footing with enhanced trade and financial cooperation. The signing of a 
bilateral currency swap agreement and the sealing of several high-profile infrastruc-
ture projects would be a clear signal that both sides are highly committed to the type 
of cooperation that implies mutual benefits.
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